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ABSTRACT 
 
Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. Bicchieri (2006) 
argues that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we 
expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to 
do (normative expectations).  Little is known about the relative importance of these two 
types of expectation in individuals’ decisions, an issue that is particularly important when 
normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high 
crime cities).  In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we 
exogenously manipulate dictators’ expectations in the direction of either selfishness or 
fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that 
empirical expectations about other dictators’ choices significantly predict a dictator’s 
own choice.  However, dictators’ expectations regarding what other dictators think ought 
to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for 
empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations 
are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable 
behavior. 
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Leges sine moribus vanae             
- Horace, Odes 3, 24  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
People often follow social norms, such as norms of reciprocity or fairness, even when 
obedience is not in their immediate self-interest and there is no obvious sanction looming 
over the potential transgressor.  Social norms are thus recognized as important 
motivations behind individual decision making in several economic models (see, e.g., 
Elster, 1989; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Camerer, 2003).  Empirical studies of norm conformity clearly show that focusing people 
on an existing norm is an important step toward compliance (Cialdini et al., 1990).  
Moreover, as argued by Bicchieri (2006), whether people obey a norm depends crucially 
on two types of expectations: empirical and normative.  That is, individuals have 
preferences for conforming to social norms that are conditional on both types of 
expectations being present.  However, how different types of expectations affect norm 
compliance, especially when they are in conflict, has gone largely unstudied. This paper 
provides, to our knowledge, the first evidence regarding the relative influence of 
empirical and normative expectations on individual decisions in situations involving 
social norms.  
The distinction between normative and empirical expectations is a long-standing one 
in the sociology and philosophy literatures (Goffman, 1963; Paprzycka, 1999).  By an 
empirical expectation of conformity to a given norm we mean that one expects the norm 
to be followed by a majority of people in the appropriate circumstances. Such 
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expectations can be grounded on past observations of conformity or its consequences, on 
indirect knowledge or even on projection, as when we think our own behavior is 
representative of what most other people would do in similar circumstances. 1 Previous 
research suggests that people tend to do what they believe others who are similar to them 
in relevant respects would do in a similar situation (Cialdini et al., 1990).  
Yet expecting others to follow a pro-social norm may not be a compelling reason to 
conform, because social norms usually prescribe behavior that may be in conflict with 
narrow, self-interested motives.  Take for example, a norm of cooperation in a social 
dilemma game. Suppose such a norm exists and it is known that a large majority of 
individuals obeys it. As cooperation always involves costs, an individual may be tempted 
to skirt the norm unless he/she also has some further reason to conform to it.  As 
discussed elsewhere (Bicchieri, 2006), empirical expectations of majority conformity is a 
necessary, but might not be a sufficient condition for norm compliance.  Normative 
expectations are the second, important ingredient in leading people to follow a norm 
(Sugden, 1998 and 2004; Bicchieri, 2006) 
 A normative expectation is the belief that others expect one to conform to a given 
norm.2  Normative expectations should not be confused with second-degree empirical 
expectations; a normative expectation involves the beliefs that others think one ought to 
conform to the norm in the appropriate circumstances, that one has an obligation to do so.   
                                                 
1 It is likely that an empirical expectation obtained by projection in the absence of any information will be 
different from one derived by observation or indirect knowledge.  What matters to our study, however, is 
how variation in expectations affects behavior.  We use information here as a means to exogenously 
generate variation in expectations.   
2 The word “normative” has different meanings in different disciplines. Here it means “what ought to be” as 
opposed to “what is.” 
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It is also important to distinguish normative expectations from personal normative 
beliefs.  The latter refer to one’s own belief regarding what ought to be done and has been 
shown to play an important role in decision making (e.g., Fishbein, 1967; Budd and 
Spencer, 1985; Baron, 1992). 3 Thus an individual may have a normative expectation 
regarding fair behavior, but have no personal normative belief about the importance of 
being fair. Conversely, a personal normative belief may not be accompanied by a 
normative expectation, as when one holds a moral value that may not be shared by 
others.4 
 Bicchieri (2006) argues that a condition for a social norm to exist is that individuals 
have a conditional preference for following the norm, provided empirical and normative 
expectations are met.  For some individuals, recognizing the legitimacy of others’ 
expectations might be enough (when combined with empirical expectations) to induce a 
preference for conformity (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Schultz, 1998; Wenzel, 2005; Xiao 
and Houser, 2008).  Other individuals might require further inducements, such as the 
                                                 
3The theory of reasoned action (TRA) incorporated subjective norms and demonstrated their importance for 
decision making (see, e.g., Schwartz and Tessler, 1972; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Sheppard et al., 1988; 
Hill et al, 1996). Subjective norms in TRA are defined as the perceived normative expectations of 
“significant others”. This view of normative expectations in TRA is similar to but more restrictive than ours.  
In particular, we do not assume that the “others” involved are either related to or significant to the subject. 
In our experiment a dictator has normative beliefs about the offers other anonymous dictators think should 
be made. In addition, the normative expectations we study here are societal while the subjective norms in 
TRA are not necessarily societal. For example, in TRA, normative beliefs may include a mother's belief 
that her daughter should exercise everyday. This belief falls outside the domain of social norms.      
4 In some philosophical circles, individuals who have a personal normative belief would be expected to 
engage in behavior that is relatively independent of the information they have about others’ beliefs and 
behavior.  That is, a person who believes in the value of equitable sharing would not be easily swayed in 
her choice by the information that others think behavior should be selfish. If we accept this view, we would 
thus expect the average response of individuals who hold a personal normative belief about fairness to be 
less sensitive to information manipulations pointing to selfish beliefs/behavior.  Such individuals will have 
a relatively unconditional preference for following a personal norm of fairness. Yet we believe that it is an 
empirical question whether personal normative beliefs can or cannot be influenced by information about 
what other people believe or do (for a discussion, see Bicchieri (2006) p. 20-21) 
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threat of sanctions, by those who expect (and want) their conformity (Fehr and Gächter, 
2000).   
 Assuming conditional preferences for following a fairness norm is different from 
assuming a fairness preference.  A person who has a preference for fairness (see, e.g., 
Camerer and Fehr, 2004) – provided we assume such preference to be stable —should 
not be influenced by information pointing to other people’s beliefs or behavior contrary 
to one’s preference.  On the other hand, if we assume other-regarding preferences to be 
conditional, it remains to be explained what they are conditioned upon.5  The theory of 
social norms we adopt takes preferences to be conditional upon the empirical and 
normative expectations that support a norm.  Thus one may be fair on one occasion and 
selfish in another, depending upon the expectations one entertains.  There is thus a major 
difference between saying one has a preference for fairness and saying one prefers to 
follow a norm of fairness on condition that certain expectations are met.  In the second 
case, we can predict that information manipulations will have a specific effect on 
behavior via a change in normative or empirical expectations.  In the first case, we are at 
a loss in predicting (and explaining) inconsistent behavior in a systematic way.   
 When a norm is largely followed, one’s expectation regarding what people will do is 
often in line with one’s expectation regarding what people think one ought to do. In this 
case, normative and empirical expectations work in the same direction and motivate the 
same behavior. For example, when most of your neighbors recycle, you form the 
empirical expectation that people do recycle. At the same time, your normative 
                                                 
5 For a lengthy discussion of the difference between social preferences and norm-based explanations, see 
Bicchieri (2006) Ch.3. 
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expectation is also that people think you should recycle. Thus, the presence of both 
expectations makes it more likely that you will recycle.    
 On the other hand, when a norm is largely violated we may experience an 
inconsistency between normative and empirical expectations.  An example is corruption.  
Even in the presence of laws and social norms condemning corruption, the widespread 
occurrence of bribery and kickbacks can induce people to form empirical expectations 
that most people are corrupt, while simultaneously holding the normative expectation that 
most people disapprove of corruption. In cases such as this, which expectation might 
have a greater effect on public officers’ willingness to accept bribes? The answer to this 
question is clearly crucial for policy and institution design. If the goal is to enforce pro-
social norms, the expectations to which we appeal matter a great deal.   
 In the past decades, many experiments have shed light on the role of social norms in 
influencing individuals’ decisions. For example, it has been argued that punishment and 
emotions are two key factors in norm compliance (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). In 
particular, it has been shown that people often incur costs to punish norm violators and in 
this way enforce norms of cooperation and fairness (Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 
2002). Absent formal sanctions, negative emotions such as shame and guilt are also 
effective enforcers of social norms (Keltner and Haidt, 1999; Elster, 1989 and 1999; 
Rilling et al., 2002). Punishment and emotions have also been closely linked to 
expectations (Lewis, 1969; Sugden, 2000).6 Meanwhile, there is substantial experimental 
literature on the importance of expectations and beliefs in directing decisions.  
                                                 
6 For example, Sugden’s theory of normative expectations suggests that humans have a desire to conform to 
the expectations of others (normative expectations) and this desire arises from a fear of disapproval or 
resentment.   
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 It is important to point out that previous studies suggest that expectations affect 
individuals’ decisions not only when expectations are payoff-related (Rapoport and 
Eshed-Levy, 1989; Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993; Offerman et al., 1996; Croson, 2000; 
Bohnet and Zeckhouser, 2004; Croson and Shang, 2006; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) 
but also when they are payoff-independent (Cason and Mui, 1998; Bardsley and 
Sausgruber, 2005; Krupka and Weber, 2008).7 
 For example, Krupka and Weber (2008) examined how social norms affect pro-social 
behavior in one-shot dictator games. They found that dictators were more likely to 
behave pro-socially when they were asked to think about either what (payoff-independent) 
others who were in the same situation would do, or what others think one should do. 
Furthermore, dictators were more likely to give a higher amount when given information 
about others’ generous behavior.   
 Effects of a payoff-independent third party’s decisions have also been found in public 
goods environments.  For example, Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) report a positive 
correlation in contribution levels between two payoff-independent groups in a one-shot 
public goods game in cases where one group is informed about the contribution decisions 
of the other group.  
 In spite of the close connection between social norms and expectations (see also 
Lewis, 1969; Bicchieri, 2006; Young, forthcoming), we are not aware of any previous 
empirical study on the relative importance of empirical and normative expectations, in 
particular when they are in conflict, in decisions about norm compliance.  Here we 
present data from Dictator games in which subjects’ empirical and normative 
                                                 
7 Brandts and Fatás (2001) investigate whether subjects’ contributions in a public goods game are affected 
by information about the average giving of others in the same situation. They find that such payoff-
independent social information has a rather weak effect on contributions.   
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expectations are exogenously and independently manipulated in the direction of fairness 
or selfishness. Our design does not involve deception.  Rather, we accomplish this 
manipulation by providing subjects with different types of (true) information in a way 
that allows us to elicit conflicting normative and empirical expectations.8 In doing so, we 
obtain systematic evidence that empirical expectations regarding other dictator’s behavior 
are the primary driving force behind norm conformity. In contrast, we find that normative 
expectations regarding what other dictators think should be done predict dictators’ 
decisions only when those expectations are positively related to their empirical 
expectations. 
 
THE STUDY 
 
Experiment Overview 
Dictator games have been widely used to study fairness or beneficence motives. In the 
standard Dictator game, two subjects are paired randomly, one as dictator (divider in the 
instructions) and the other as receiver (counterpart in the instructions). The dictator 
decides how much of $10 s/he wants to send to the receiver and the receiver earns that 
amount.  Often people make different decisions and also have different belief regarding 
what decisions ought to be made in these games (Xiao and Houser, 2008; Bardsley, 
2007 ). The amount sent can be interpreted as a measure of beneficence, because there 
                                                 
8 The role of deception in experiments is much discussed, and different fields adopt different perspectives 
(see, e.g., Bonetti, 1998; Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002.) Deception occurs when an experimenter 
intentionally provides false or incorrect information to subjects. Our design clearly does not involve 
deception because all information given to subjects was truthful and was truthfully described. In particular, 
subjects were instructed that the statistics they saw were from “one session of a previous experiment.” Note 
that we were very careful not to suggest to subjects that the reported behaviors and choices represented a 
general pattern. 
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are no other consequences associated with dictators’ decisions.  A fairness motive may 
also be present, but it is usually evidenced in those experiments that focus subjects on fair 
sharing.  By providing participants with different types of true information about other 
subjects’ choices (fair/selfish) and beliefs (about fairness/selfishness), we exogenously 
manipulate dictators’ expectations, and compare dictators’ decisions under different 
normative and empirical expectations.  
 
METHOD 
 
Expectation manipulation 
To manipulate dictators’ expectations, we selectively drew data from some sessions of 
Dictator games reported in Xiao and Houser (2008). We presented each dictator with a 
message summarizing the majority of the dictators’ actual choices (i.e., empirical 
information) or/ and the majority beliefs about what ought to be done (i.e., normative 
information) in one previous session. The message content of each treatment is presented 
in Table 1. We refer to divisions that provide $5 or $4 (i.e. option C or D in the 
experiment) to receivers as fair, and $2 or $1 (i.e. option A or B) as selfish.9  For example, 
when we provided information about a majority of dictators making a fair choice (FC), 
we wanted to generate an empirical expectation of fairness in our subjects.  Conversely, 
when we conveyed information about the belief that one “ought to” be fair (FB) on the 
                                                 
9 In our case a fair offer can be viewed as an offer that achieves an equal or close to equal payoff outcome. 
Thus, we frame 40% or 50% offers as fair and offers of 20% or 10% as selfish. As we mentioned, the data 
we presented to the subjects were taken from Xiao and Houser (2008), and we adopt here exactly the same 
design. In particular, the offer can be any integer amount between $1 and $9 excluding $7 and $3.  
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part of a majority of dictators, we aimed at generating a normative expectation of fairness 
in our subjects.  
We considered six treatments in total: Fair Beliefs treatment (FB); Selfish Beliefs 
treatment (SB); Fair Choices treatment (FC); Selfish Choices treatment (SC); Fair Beliefs 
but Selfish Choices treatment (FB+SC) and Selfish Beliefs but Fair Choices treatment 
(SB+FC). In the first four treatments we aimed at manipulating only one of the two types 
of expectation, in the direction of either fairness or selfishness. In the last two treatments 
our goal was to manipulate both empirical and normative expectations, but in opposite 
directions.  
In the FB (or FC) treatment, dictators are presented with data from a session where 
the majority of dictators believed that a fair split should be chosen (or chose a fair split). 
Thus, we hypothesize that our subjects’ normative (empirical) expectations will move 
toward fairness, and therefore generate more fair offers. Similarly, in the SB (or SC) 
treatment when subjects are informed that a majority of previous dictators believed that 
only a small amount should be offered (or offered an unfair split), normative (empirical) 
expectations will move toward selfishness, leading to an increase in selfish offers. 
Inferences about the effects of these different expectations can be drawn by examining 
dictators’ decisions when there is a conflict between normative and empirical 
expectations in the FB+SC and SB+FC treatments: the normative expectation goes in the 
direction of fairness (selfishness) but the empirical expectation is that other dictators 
behave selfishly (fairly). 
Since we use data from Xiao and Houser (2008), our Dictator game is designed like 
the game they devised.  In particular, dictators can offer receivers any integer amount 
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from $1 to $9, excluding $7 and $3.  In our experiment dictators receive information, so 
one possible complication is that this information might lead to experimenter demand 
effects (e.g., subjects might try to guess the experimenter’s intention and behave 
accordingly). To mitigate this problem, we used a “double blind” procedure that ensures 
subjects understand that neither other subjects nor the experimenter can connect a 
dictator’s decision to a dictator’s identity (see the instructions in Appendix A for details). 
In addition, the message containing the information follows a short note: In previous 
experiments, dividers have often wanted to know the views or decisions of other dividers. 
The information below is given to every divider in this experiment.10  
 
Expectation elicitation 
Immediately after each dictator made her decision, we gave her a survey to elicit her 
expectations about the choices and presumed expectations of other participants in the 
experiment. Dictators were rewarded based on the accuracy of the expectations they 
reported. In particular, to elicit empirical expectations, dictators were asked how many 
dictators they believed split the money approximately equally (i.e., gave the receiver $5 
or $4), and were paid $1 if their answer matched the actual number of fair choices. 
 Normative expectations refer to a dictator’s beliefs regarding what others think one 
ought to do. To elicit these expectations, subjects were asked, first, whether they thought 
dictators should split the money approximately equally;11 and second, how many 
                                                 
10 We expect experimenter demand effects to be small especially in the FB+SC and SB+FC treatments, as 
in these cases we presented subjects with conflicting information. As discussed below, these are the two 
main treatments of our experiment.  
11 The answer to this question reveals one's personal normative belief. An alternative way is to ask "Do you 
think you should make a fair offer?".  In our experiment, the answers to the original and the alternative 
question should be the same, as our dictators have no reason to believe that they are in a different situation 
than any other dictator. 
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dictators they believed answered “yes” to the first question. A dictator was paid $1 if her 
answer to the second question matched the actual number of “yes” answers.12  
This paper focuses on the role of dictators’ normative and empirical expectations 
about other dictators on their decisions.  Dictators are aware that messages are provided 
only to other dictators in the experiment. Still, it might be possible that messages 
somehow influence dictators’ empirical expectations regarding their receivers’ beliefs 
about what the dictator would or should do. This “receiver expectation” effect might 
itself influence a dictator’s decision. To control for this influence, in the survey we asked 
dictators what they thought their receivers believed they would and should choose. A 
dictator was paid $1 if his/her answer matched the receiver’s answer. Copies of the 
dictator and the receiver surveys are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Participants 
Two hundred and fifty four students (113 male and 141 female) at the University of 
Pennsylvania participated in the study. There were no significant gender differences on 
any measure. Each subject received a $5 show up bonus in addition to the money earned 
in the game and the survey ($6 on average). Subjects were in the lab about 30 minutes.  
 
                                                 
12 The two questions distinguish personal normative beliefs from normative expectations. In particular, our 
data reveal that the large majority (80%) of the dictators who stated they should make fair offers (i.e., held 
a personal normative belief in fairness) did not also expect all dictators to believe dictators should make fair 
offers (that is, the answer to the second question is less than 100%). In particular, among the dictators who 
revealed personal normative beliefs in fairness, about 15% of them expected that less than 50% of dictators 
would view a fair offer as the right thing to do. 
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Procedures 
Each subject was randomly assigned the role of dictator or receiver. Dictators and 
receivers were separated and they could not see each other or communicate throughout 
the experiment.  Each subject was randomly assigned a letter as his or her ID for the 
duration of the experiment. A receiver and a dictator were paired if they held the same 
letter. All subjects received an instruction sheet explaining the rules of the game.  In 
addition to the instructions, each dictator also received a separate sheet with one of the 
messages listed in Table 1 and the short note mentioned in section II. A. A dictator’s 
decision card was attached to the message sheet. The game started after every subject 
finished the instructions. 
Each subject played the game exactly once. Our procedures ensured it was clear to 
dictators that no one, including the experimenters, knew their decisions. Dictators 
indicated their chosen split on a decision sheet, wrote down their ID on the back of the 
decision card and then put the card into a blank envelope. After all dictators had finished, 
the experimenter collected all the envelopes and then gave each receiver his or her 
dictator’s envelope according to the ID. At the end of the experiment, subjects’ earnings 
were put in envelopes marked with ID letters. Each subject picked up her earnings 
envelope privately.  
 
RESULTS 
 
We obtained observations on 254 subjects: 21 pairs in the FB treatment; 19 pairs in the 
SB treatment; 21 in FC treatment; 24 in SC treatment; 20 in FB+SC treatment and 22 in 
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SB+FC treatment. We begin with an aggregative analysis that compares dictators’ 
expectations among treatments and reveals the relationship between mean expectations 
and mean decisions. We then report an individual-level analysis connecting subjects’ 
expectations to their behaviors. Our results provide evidence that empirical expectations 
about other dictators’ behaviors, but not normative expectations, are a key force behind 
dictators’ choices. 
 
Aggregate analysis of expectations and choices 
 
Dictator’s expectations by treatment 
Every dictator (except one in the SC treatment) answered the question “How many 
dividers in this room do you think split the money approximately equally (chose either C 
or D)” (this is their empirical expectation of fair offers, henceforth, EE(fairness)). From 
this we were able to calculate the percentage of fair offers each dictator i in each 
treatment k expected ( )( offerfairEE ki ). We then obtained the overall mean percentage 
of fair offers expected by dictators for each treatment ( )( offerfairEE k ).  
)( offerfairEE k =
k
n
i
k
i
n
offerfairEE
k∑
=1
)(
; where nk is the total number of dictators in each 
treatment k.13  Figure 1 plots this average by treatment. 
Each dictator also reported her expectation regarding the number of dictators in the 
experiment who believe that dictators should split the money approximately equally (this 
                                                 
13 As we mentioned above, every dictator answered the question except one in SC treatment. Therefore, nSC 
=24-1=23. In other treatments, nSB =19; nFC =21; nFB+SC =20 and nSB+FC =22.  
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is the normative expectation of fair offers, henceforth, NE(fairness)).  We 
calculated )( offerfairNE ki , i.e., for each treatment k, each dictator i’s normative 
expectation regarding the percentage of dictators who believe fair offers should be made. 
Similarly to the calculation of )( offerfairEE k , we calculated the average of 
)( offerfairNE ki in each treatment, )( offerfairNE
k . This average by treatment is also 
plotted in Figure 1.  
First, as expected, EE(fair offer) and NE(fair offer) in FB and FC treatments are 
significantly higher than those in SB and SC treatments (p<0.001 in all the four pairwise 
Mann-Whitney tests). It is important to note that when only one message (either about 
other dictators’ beliefs or choices) is presented, both empirical and normative 
expectations are affected. For example, in the fair choice (FC) treatment where dictators 
were only informed that the majority of dictators in another session made a fair offer, 
dictators expected 64% of dictators to make fair offers and also expected 68% of dictators 
to believe that fair offers ought to be made. In contrast, in the selfish choice (SC) 
treatment, when dictators only knew that a majority of dictators in a previous session 
made a selfish offer (i.e., gave $2 or $1), dictators expected that only 37% of dictators 
would make a fair offer and that just 41% of dictators believed fair offers ought to be 
made as well. Similarly, EE (fairness) and NE(fairness) are 18% and 25% in the selfish 
beliefs (SB) treatment, and both expectations are much higher in the fair beliefs (FB) 
treatment (60%  and 67%, respectively).  
The fact that both normative and empirical expectations change in the same direction 
in response to information about other dictators’ choices or beliefs could imply that 
subjects do not make a sharp distinction between the two expectations, at least when only 
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one piece of information is given.  We want to suggest that, in the presence of a single 
message, subjects have no reason to distinguish normative from empirical expectations. 
In the absence of any other relevant information, the simplest assumption to make is that 
behavior and the beliefs that support it are correlated.  When dictators are told other 
dictators behaved selfishly, they might assume those dictators also considered selfish 
behavior appropriate in the circumstance.  Conversely, when they are told other dictators 
consider selfish behavior appropriate, they would expect consistent behavior to follow.  
An interesting feature of our data is that information regarding selfish beliefs alone 
(our SB treatment) has a greater effect on empirical and normative expectations of 
fairness than information regarding selfish choices alone (our SC treatment).  One 
possible reason is that information about approval of behavior that is usually considered 
inappropriate or wrong has a strong effect on people who may overreact to it. Usually we 
do not expect people to express strong beliefs in selfishness, especially in a situation 
where a fair division is possible.   
Be that as it may, what matters to us in this study is not the effects of normative and 
empirical information on expectations.  Here we want to assess the relative importance of 
empirical and normative expectations on choice. The fact that dictators change both 
empirical and normative expectations in the same direction when only one message is 
presented implies that dictators’ decisions in the SB, SC, FB and FC treatments cannot 
distinguish the roles played in decision-making by empirical and normative expectations, 
respectively.  However, this is not the case in the fair belief + selfish choice ( FB+SC) 
and selfish belief + fair choice (SB+FC) treatments. 
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For one, NE(fairness) and EE (fairness) move in the opposite direction from the 
FB+SC treatment to the SB+FC treatment (see Figure 1).  In addition, the normative 
expectations of fair offers in the FB+SC treatment are significantly higher than the 
empirical expectations of fair offers (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p=0.01). 
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that confronting subjects with conflicting 
information can differentiate normative and empirical expectations.  By analyzing 
decisions in the FB+SC and SB+FC treatments, along with other treatments, we next 
show that empirical expectations predict decisions significantly better than normative 
expectations.   
 
Expectations and fair choices 
Figure 2 plots the percentage of dictators making fair offers in each treatment. First, as 
expected, the percentage of fair offers is lower in the SB and SC treatments and much 
higher in the FC and FB treatments. In particular, the percentage of fair offers in the SC 
treatment is the same as the percentage of fair offers in the SB treatment (33% vs. 21%, 
Z-test, p=0.37). However, in comparison to the SB treatment, significantly more dictators 
make fair offers in the FB and FC treatments (48% vs. 21%, Z-test, one-tail p= 0.04; and 
52% vs. 21%, Z-test, one-tail p=0.02; respectively). Furthermore, the percentage of fair 
offers in the SB+FC treatment is significantly higher than in the SB treatment (45% vs. 
21%, Z-test, one tail p=0.05) but not significantly lower than in the FC treatment (45% vs. 
52%, Z-test, one-tail p=0.32). The percentage of fair offers in the FB+SC treatment is 
closer to what we observe in the SC rather than in the FB treatment although neither of 
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the two comparisons yields a statistically significant difference (35% vs. 33%, Z-test, 
p=0.91 and 35% vs. 48%, Z-test, p=0.42, respectively),   
Figure 3 offers comparisons between empirical/normative expectations and decisions. 
While empirical expectations about the percentage of fair choices are insignificantly 
different from the actual percentage of fair offers in each treatment (t<1.6; p>0.10 in all 
comparisons), normative expectations are significantly higher than actual fair choices in 
the FB+SC treatments (57% vs. 35%, t=1.72, one tail p=0.05).  
 
Individual level analysis of expectations and choices 
 
The results derived by aggregating our data suggest that mean empirical expectations are 
better predictors of mean decisions than mean normative expectations. Of course, 
aggregate data do not give us much information about the effect of expectations on 
decisions at the individual level. To investigate how the two types of expectations affect 
subjects’ specific decisions we pursue next such an analysis.  
Our approach centers on a Probit regression. Our binary dependent variable is 
whether dictator i made a fair offer14. We assume the probit model’s error term is 
independent among subjects in different sessions but allow it to be correlated among 
                                                 
14 In the message given to the dictators, offering 50% or 40% to the receiver is described as a fair offer 
while 10% or 20% is described as a selfish offer. Moreover, as discussed above, expectations are also 
elicited according to these two categories. Thus, we classify decisions using these same categories. There 
are of course many other ways one might form categories. For example, an alternative categorization is to 
define a dependent variable Y so that Y=4 if the offer 50% or more; Y=3 if the offer is 40%; Y=2 if the 
offer is 20% and Y=1 if the offer is10%). A multivariate analysis using this more finely categorized 
dependent variable yields results consistent with the probit regression model we reported here. Our data as 
well as these alternative analyses are available from the authors on request.        
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subjects within the same session. Our independent variables included )( offerfairEE ki  
and )( offerfairNE ki . 
 In addition, it is possible that dictators’ expectations about receivers’ beliefs are 
affected by the information they receive in each treatment, and if so this could also 
influence dictators’ decisions. For each treatment we obtained data on whether dictator i 
believes her receiver would expect her to make a fair offer ( )'( EEsreceiverEE ki =1 if the 
dictator believes her receiver expects she will offer 40% or 50%; and equals zero 
otherwise). 15 We included this expectation as a third independent variable. 
In our experiment expectations were exogenously manipulated. Nevertheless, it is in 
principle possible that our regression analysis suffers from an endogeneity bias due to the 
inclusion of elicited expectations as independent variables. In particular, if subjects’ 
declared expectations depend on their decisions, then elicited expectations would be 
endogenous in our analysis. To address this potential endogeneity problem we conducted 
a two-stage IV probit regression analysis using our information treatments as instruments 
for expectations. 16 Because the treatments are exogenous to the subjects, the treatment 
variables should be uncorrelated with the error term in the probit regression model.     
The results of our IV probit regression are detailed in Table 2. As it is difficult to 
interpret the coefficients of a probit model, we also report the marginal effects in the 
fourth column, evaluated at mean values for the independent variables. Just as in our 
aggregate analysis above, we find that the dictators’ empirical expectations 
                                                 
15 In all sessions, at least 80% of dictators expect receivers to believe that dividers should make a fair offer. 
The absence of variation along this dimension among treatments suggests that this expectation has no 
significant effect on dictators’ decisions.  
16 We thank one anonymous referee for the suggestion.  
 20
)( offerfairEE ki have a statistically significant and positive effect on the probability that 
a dictator will make a fair offer. In particular, the marginal effect of )( offerfairEE ki is 
0.012. For example, this implies that, ceteris paribus and evaluated at mean values for the 
independent variables, the probability that a dictator makes a fair offer increases by about 
six percentage points if her )( offerfairEE ki increases from 45% to 50%. 
In contrast to the substantial effect of empirical expectations, the coefficient of 
normative expectations )( offerfairNE ki  is statistically insignificant, and its marginal 
effect on the probability of fair choices is economically insignificant in magnitude.  
In summary, both our aggregative and individual-level analyses together provide 
convergent evidence that empirical expectations about other dictators’ behaviors, but not 
normative expectations, are significant predictors of dictators’ decisions. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Previous experimental and theoretical research has demonstrated that payoff-relevant 
information about other people’s actions or beliefs has a significant impact on one’s own 
pro-social behavior (see, e.g., Samuelson, 2005 or Fehr and Schmidt, 2002 for excellent 
reviews).  In line with many other previous studies (e.g., Cason and Mui, 1998; Krupka 
and Weber, 2008; Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005), we provide experimental evidence 
that information about payoff-independent behaviors or beliefs of other subjects can also 
affect norm obedience via changing individuals’ empirical/normative beliefs.  
Our paper presents, to our knowledge, the first systematic study of the relative 
influence of empirical and normative expectations on norm-abiding behavior. Our data 
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provide compelling evidence that empirical expectations regarding other people’s 
behaviors well-predict one’s own decisions.  Expectations regarding what other people 
think one ought to do can also predict decisions, but our results suggest this is true only to 
the extent that such expectations are in line with the choices one believes others would 
actually make.  When normative and empirical expectations are inconsistent, our data 
indicate that people do what they think others would do in that same situation, even when 
they believe doing so would not be met with approval.  
The weight of empirical expectations in decision-making has important implications 
for the external validity of experimental results in dictator games (List, 2007).  Whether 
lab results are consistent with behavior we observe in a natural environment is a subject 
we cannot even start to tackle here.  Results from cognitive psychology suggest that, 
whenever we encounter a new situation, we immediately categorize it as relevantly 
similar to a class of situations we know, and in so doing we prime scripts that tell us how 
to interpret it, what to believe and expect, and how to act (Shank and Abelson, 1977).  If 
norms are part of scripts (Bicchieri, 2006), then whether a specific norm will become 
salient depends upon the way we categorize a given situation.   
Henrich et al. (2001) show that the same game played in different small societies 
engenders very different behaviors, and this variability seems to be due to the way 
different societies categorize the game they are playing.  For example, why do we see 
dictators give away money in experiments but lottery winners usually do not give away 
some of their earnings to strangers? As argued in Bicchieri (2006) and Houser 
(forthcoming), behaviors in naturally occurring and experimental environments are 
reconciled if dictators and lottery winners make different decisions due to different 
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beliefs regarding what other people would do in their specific situation.  Such beliefs, in 
turn, depend upon the way we categorize these situations and the scripts we follow. 17  
In a Dictator game, our manipulation focuses subjects upon selfish/fair behavior, and 
induces beliefs that support selfish/fair choices.  The fact that, in the presence of 
conflicting information, empirical expectations have greater weight in influencing 
choices has important implication for the policy makers whose goal is to stipulate 
regulations to mitigate undesirable behavior, especially when violations are common.  
Our findings suggest that, for a policy to be effective, it is not enough to emphasize only 
the illegitimacy or the negative consequences of the undesirable behavior.  It is even 
more important to stress that many people do follow the relevant norms.  When 
monitoring and punishing transgressions is costly, it may pay to disseminate information 
about the (presumably large) number of norm-followers. 
  Our findings leave unexplained why people tend to follow empirical instead of 
normative expectations when these two are inconsistent. One possible reason is that, in 
naturally occurring environments, punishment is often imposed on those whose behavior 
differs from the majority. On the other hand, even when it is not formally approved, 
misconduct might be only weakly punished – or perhaps not punished at all – when the 
behavior is common.  For example, in a society with high rates of corruption people are 
not likely to expect corrupt acts to be punished, even in those cases where there exist 
laws explicitly prohibiting corruption. To foster our understanding of how norms, 
expectations and decisions interact we are conducting further research on punishment 
decisions and their connection to normative and empirical expectations.  
                                                 
17 Camerer (2003) discusses several examples of framing effects in experimental games.  
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Table 1. Messages by treatment 
Treatment Message 
FB:  
Fair Belief  
60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year said that dividers should share the amount 
approximately equally (i.e., choose option C or D (their 
counterpart gets 40% or more)). 
SB:  
Selfish Belief  
60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year said that dividers should approximately 
maximize their own earnings (i.e., choose option A or B (their 
counterpart gets 20% or less)).   
FC:  
Fair Choice 
60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year shared the amount approximately equally 
(i.e., chose option C or D (their counterpart got 40% or more)).  
SC:  
Selfish Choice  
60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year approximately maximized their own 
earnings (i.e., chose option A or B (their counterpart got 20% 
or less)). 
FB+SC:  
Fair Belief but Selfish Choice  
60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year said that dividers should share the amount 
approximately equally (i.e., choose option C or D (their 
counterpart gets 40% or more)).  
 
On the other hand, in a different session of this experiment last 
year, 60% of the dividers approximately maximized their own 
earnings (i.e., chose option A or B (their counterpart got 20% 
or less)). 
SB+FC:  
Selfish Belief but Fair Choice 
60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year said that dividers should approximately 
maximize their own earnings (i.e., choose option A or B (their 
counterpart gets 20% or less)).  
 
On the other hand, in a different session of this experiment last 
year, 60% of the dividers shared the amount approximately 
equally (i.e., chose option C or D (their counterpart got 40% or 
more)).   
 
Note: The order of the two messages in FB+SC treatment and SB+FC treatment is randomized.  
It turns out there is not order effect. 
 
 30
Table 2: Two Stage IV Probit Analysis of Expectation Effects (Sample size = 126) 
 
Dictator i ’s offer (=1, if gave $5 or $4; =0, o.w) 
 
 
    Coefficients P value Marginal Effects 
 
Mean of the 
independent 
variable 
)( offerfairEE ki  0.033 
(0.011) 
0.002 0.012 
(0.005) 
 45.337 
)( offerfairNE ki  -0.017 
((0.011) 
0.132 -0.006 
(0.005) 
 52.090 
)'( EEsreceiverEE ki  0.352 
(0.439) 
0.422 0.135 
(0.12) 
 0.362 
Constant -1.030 
(0.354) 
0.004    
Instrumented: )( offerfairEE ki , )( offerfairNE
k
i  , )'( EEsreceiverEE
k
i  
  
Instruments: FB, FC, FB+SC, FC+SB, SC   
Wald test of exogeneity:     chi2(3) =    35.84       Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
* Pseudo R2 : 0.430 
  
 
 
Note: the numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. The marginal effects are    
evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.  
* The Pseudo R2 is calculated using an equivalent probit model but without instrumental 
variables. 
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 Figure 1: Dictators’ normative and empirical expectations of the percentage of fair 
offers (i.e., offer $5 or $4 to the receivers)  
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Note: The vertical lines represent standard errors (this is also the case for all figures 
below.) 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Dictators who made fair offers in each treatment 
0
20
40
60
80
SB SC FB+SC SB+FC FB FC
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
 
 
 32
Figure 3: Expectations and fair offers 
(A) Empirical Expectations and fair offers 
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Appendix A.  
I. Divider Instructions 
Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a question 
please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in this room. You will never be 
informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, your matched 
participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Divider and your matched 
participant will be referred to as your Counterpart. You and your Counterpart will participate only once in 
this decision problem. All the decisions will be anonymous. 
  
This is how the experiment works. 
 
Your task is to divide $10 between the two of you. How much money you end up with at the end of the 
experiment depends on the decisions you make. 
 
Divider (You) 
You will choose a Dividing Option (described in detail below).  A Dividing Option determines how much 
of $10 will go to the Divider (you) and how much will go to your Counterpart.   
 
Dividing Option 
The possible divisions appear in the table below.  You must choose only one of them. 
 
Possible Dividing Options The option is 
A Divider gets $9  and Counterpart gets $1 
B Divider gets $8 and Counterpart gets $2 
C Divider gets $6 and Counterpart gets $4 
D Divider gets $5 and Counterpart gets $5 
E Divider gets $4  and Counterpart gets $6 
F Divider gets $2  and Counterpart gets $8 
G Divider gets $1 and Counterpart gets $9 
 
 
Experiment Procedure: 
 
Step 1: Random and anonymous assignment of counterparts  
Each of you has randomly chosen an envelope.  In each envelope there is a tag marked with a letter. This 
letter is your ID for this experiment.  Persons in this room who get tags marked with the same letter will be 
paired. Please do not show anyone your ID letter. 
 
Step 2: Divider chooses the option 
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The Divider will be given a card where s/he can write down her/his decision. Below is a sample decision 
card: 
  
 
 
 
 
After making the decision, the Divider will also write the letter ID on the back of the decision card, and 
then put it into his/her envelope.  
 
Step 3: The Counterpart receives the Divider’s decision. 
After every Divider has finished, the experimenter will give each Divider’s envelope to his/her Counterpart 
according to the ID on the card. The Counterpart will see the decision made by the divider and then put the 
decision card back into the envelope. After each Counterpart has finished an experimenter will collect all 
the envelopes. 
 
Step 4: Receive cash payment privately 
The experimenter will calculate the earnings of each Divider and each Counterpart. To keep everyone’s 
decision and earnings anonymous, the experimenter will put each participant’s earnings in an envelope 
marked with her/his ID letter. All Dividers’ envelopes will be placed on one desk, and all Counterparts’ 
envelopes will be placed on a different desk. Then, Dividers will be called one by one.  When called, each 
Divider will pick up the envelope labeled with her/his letter ID. Then the Divider will exit the lab and drop 
all other supplies into the box outside the lab door.  Every Counterpart will be paid in the same way after 
all the Dividers have been paid and have left the lab.  
 
Divider and Counterpart will remain anonymously matched at all times during the experiment. Even 
the experimenter will not know your decisions.   
 
End of Instructions 
 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions.  
Divider: (Dividing option) 
  I choose dividing option_______. That is,  
Divider gets $_____     Counterpart gets $____ 
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II. Counterpart Instructions 
Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a question 
please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in this room. You will never be 
informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, your matched 
participant will never be informed about your identity. Your matched participant is in the role of Divider 
and you will be referred to as Divider’s Counterpart. You and your Divider will participate only once in 
this decision problem. All the decisions will be anonymous. 
 
This is how the experiment works. 
 
The task is to divide $10 between the two of you. How much money you end up with at the end of the 
experiment depends on the decision your Divider makes. 
 
Divider  
The Divider will choose a Dividing Option (described in detail below).  A Dividing Option determines how 
much of $10 will go to the Divider and how much will go to you.   
 
Dividing Option 
The possible divisions appear in the table below.  The Divider must choose only one of them. 
 
 
Possible Dividing Options The option is 
A Divider gets $9  and Counterpart gets $1 
B Divider gets $8 and Counterpart gets $2 
C Divider gets $6 and Counterpart gets $4 
D Divider gets $5 and Counterpart gets $5 
E Divider gets $4  and Counterpart gets $6 
F Divider gets $2  and Counterpart gets $8 
G Divider gets $1 and Counterpart gets $9 
 
 
Experiment Procedure: 
 
Step 1: Random and anonymous assignment of counterparts  
Each of you has randomly chosen an envelope.  In each envelope there is a tag marked with a letter. This 
letter is your ID for this experiment.  Persons in this room who get tags marked with the same letter will be 
paired. Please do not show anyone your ID letter. 
 
Step 2: Divider chooses the option 
The Divider will be given a card where s/he can write down her/his decision. Below is a sample decision 
card: 
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After making the decision, the Divider will also write the letter ID on the back of the decision card, and 
then put it into his/her envelope.  
 
Step 3: The Counterpart receives the Divider’s decision. 
After every Divider has finished, the experimenter will give each Divider’s envelope to his/her Counterpart 
according to the ID on the card. The Counterpart will see the decision made by the divider and then put the 
decision card back into the envelope. After each Counterpart has finished an experimenter will collect all 
the envelopes. 
 
Step 4: Receive cash payment privately 
The experimenter will calculate the earnings of each Divider and each Counterpart. To keep everyone’s 
decision and earnings anonymous, the experimenter will put each participant’s earnings in an envelope 
marked with her/his ID letter. All Dividers’ envelopes will be placed on one desk, and all Counterparts’ 
envelopes will be placed on a different desk. Then, Dividers will be called one by one.  When called, each 
Divider will pick up the envelope labeled with her/his letter ID. Then the Divider will exit the lab and drop 
all other supplies into the box outside the lab door.  Every Counterpart will be paid in the same way after 
all the Dividers have been paid and have left the lab.  
 
Divider and Counterpart will remain anonymously matched at all times during the experiment. Even 
the experimenter will not know your decisions.   
 
End of Instructions 
 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions.  
Divider: (Dividing option) 
  I choose dividing option_______. That is,  
Divider gets $_____     Counterpart gets $____ 
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Appendix B.  
I. Divider survey 
Please write down your ID________    Gender_______ (Divider) 
Please answer the following questions. You can earn extra money depending on your answers. 
Please Note: To answer some of the questions below you need to know that there are ….. dividers in 
this room.  
 
a)  How did you make your decision? (Write on the back of the paper if you need more space) 
 
 
b)  How many dividers in this room do you think split the money approximately equally (chose either 
C or D)?  
(If your answer is the same as the actual number, you will earn an additional $1) 
 
c) How many dividers in this room do you think approximately maximized their payoff (choose A or 
B)?  
(If your answer is the same as the actual number, you will earn an additional $1) 
 
d)   Do you think that dividers should split the money approximately equally (choose C or D)?  
 
e) Do you think that dividers should approximately maximize their payoff (choose A or B)?  
 
f) How many dividers in this room do you think answered “Yes” to question d)?  
(If your answer is the same as the actual number, you will receive an additional $1). 
 
g) How many dividers in this room do you think answered “Yes” to question e)?  
(If your answer is the same as the actual number, you will receive an additional $1). 
 
h)   Which option do you think your counterpart believed you WOULD choose?  
(If your answer is the same as what your counterpart wrote on his/her survey before he/she knew your final 
decision, you will earn an additional $1). 
 
i.)   Which option do you think your counterpart believed you SHOULD choose?  
(If your answer is the same as what your counterpart wrote on his/her survey before he/she knew your final 
decision, you will earn an additional $1). 
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II. Receiver survey18 
 
Please write down your ID________     Gender_________ (Counterpart) 
Please answer the following question. You can earn extra money depending on your answer. 
 
a) Which option do you think your divider WOULD choose? Why? 
(If your answer matches your divider’s actual decision, you will earn an additional $2). 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Which option do you think your divider SHOULD choose? Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Suppose that 60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment last  
year said that dividers should share the amount approximately equally (i.e., choose option C 
or D (their counterpart gets 40% or more)).  If your divider knew this, which option do you 
think your divider WOULD choose? Why? 
                                                 
18 Receiver’s survey questions are the same in each treatment except question c). As we told dictators that 
only dividers were given information about the result of a previous session, to avoid deception, the scenario 
in question c) is different from the message dictators received in each treatment. In particular, the survey 
sample shown here comes from the SC treatment data. 
